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NARROWING THE "ROUTINE USE" 
EXEMPTION TO THE PRIVACY ACT 
OF 1974 
Respect for individual privacy1 runs deep in Anglo-American 
culture and history.2 Nonetheless, a legal right to privacy was 
not suggested until 1890,8 and it was not until this century that 
' By denying individuality and uniqueness, invasion of privacy strikes at the root of 
human identity. Similarly, by so highly illuminating the individual, privacy infringement 
serves as a source of insight and, ultimately, control. For example, consider these true-
false questions from a psychological test required for certain federal jobs: 
1. My sex life is satisfactory. 
2. I have no difficulty in starting or holding my bowel movements. 
3. I am very strongly attracted to members of my own sex. 
4. I believe there is a God. 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory: Hearings on Psychological Tests and 
Constitutional Rights Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the State 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in Ervin, The First 
Amendment-A Living Thought in the Computer Age, 4 CoLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS REV. 
13, 31 (1972). When knowledge of this depth is coupled with the organizational ability 
and omnipresence of modern government, political disaster may result. See, e.g., Privacy, 
the Collection, Use, and Computerization of Personal Data: Joint Hearings on S. 3418, 
S. 3633, S. 2810, S. 2542, Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Privacy and Informations 
Systems of the Comm. on Government Operations and the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Rights of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1974) (statement of Alan 
F. Westin) [hereinafter cited as Personal Data Hearings]. 
As Alexander Solzhenitzyn says: 
As every man goes through life, he fills in a number of forms for the record, 
each containing a number of questions ... There are thus hundreds of little 
threads radiating from each man, millions of threads in all. If these threads were 
suddenly to become visible, the whole sky would look like a spider's web . . . . 
A. SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD 192 (1969). 
• Witness the durability of Lord Coke's phrase, "a man's house is his castle." Coiu:, 
INSTITUTES: COMMENTS UPON Ll'M'LETON, THIRD INSTITUTE 161 (1797). In the United 
States, the Supreme Court has long regarded the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on 
unreasonable searches and seizures as an assurance of "the sanctity of a man's home and 
the privacies of life." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Even early census 
takers, the most inquisitive of the young republic's officials, carefully guarded the confi-
dentiality of certain commercial information. U.S. COMM. ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK: CON· 
PIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY, 16-17 (1977). [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL PAPERWORK 
COMMISSION]. 
• Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The authors 
surveyed a number of cases decided under the guise of defamation or breach of confi-
dence, and concluded that the holdings could be explained better by postulating a right 
of privacy. All but four states have recognized the consequent tort, invasion of privacy. 
See W. PROSSER, THE LAW or TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1971). 
126 
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the courts recognized remedies for privacy invasions. 4 More re-
cently, Congress has addressed the specific privacy objections 
arising from government collection and use of personal informa-
tion. Indeed, by the mid-1970's, congressional concern over fed-
eral abuse of sensitive personal data had become so significant11 
that Congress passed the seminal Privacy Act of 1974.8 
The Privacy Act prohibits any disclosure of federal agency 
records without the explicit written consent of the person to 
whom the record pertains.7 Although this prohibition is exten-
sive, applying to all records and means of disclosure, it is subject 
to several major exceptions. 8 Of these, the one most subject to 
• The first significant tort case to recognize a formal right to privacy was Pavesich v. 
New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905), in which damages were 
awarded for the unauthorized use of plaintiff's photograph and the publication of a fake 
testimonial. Since then, tort law has found invasion of privacy in such diverse situations 
as invasion of a residence, see, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Williams, 108 Ga. App. 21, 132 
S.E.2d 206 (1963); publication of private information, see, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 131 Cal. 
App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931); and false attribution of a belief or.opinion, see, e.g., Hinish v. 
Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941). 
Within the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has also recognized a constitutional 
right to privacy. In a recent attempt to defend this right, the Court stated that privacy 
includes, "[an] individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, [and an] 
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Wahlen v. 
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (state statute authorizing computer records of drug 
prescriptions held not to be an invasion of privacy). Although the Court may continue to 
refine the scope of privacy protection, there can be little doubt of its constitutional man-
date to do so. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (constitutional right of privacy 
includes woman's right to abortion); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (violation by federal agents of Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures created private cause of ac-
tion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964) (state statute banning use of contra-
ceptives by married couple held unconstitutional invasion of privacy). 
• Popular outcry, to a large degree, spurred Congress' concern. For example, one man 
wrote to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights complaining about an FBI 
file which detailed his arrest on theft charges. The man, an adolescent at the time of the 
arrest, was quickly cleared of the charges. Nonetheless, for at least fifteen years the FBI 
file was sent to employers upon their request. Ervin, supra note 1, at 24. 
• 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976). 
' The Act states in pertinent part: "No agency shall disclose any record which is con-
tained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to an-
other agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent 
of, the individual to whom the record pertains .... " Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(b) (1976). 
• The eleven exceptions allow disclosure: 
(1) to those officers and employees of the agency which maintains the records 
(2) required under [the Freedom of Information Act] ... 
(3) for a routine use ... 
(4) to the Bureau of the Census ... 
(5) to a recipient who has provided the agency with . . . written assurance 
that the record will be used solely as a statistical research . . . in a form that is 
not individually identifiable; 
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abuse is the routine use exemption, which allows the communi-
cation of records, without consent, "for a purpose which is com-
patible with the purpose for which [the information) was 
collected. "9 
This article suggests a balancing test to determine which rou-
tine uses of information legitimately fall within the Privacy Act. 
Part I briefly examines the background of the Act, concentrating 
on the legislative history of the routine use exemption, and ex-
amining problems the exemption presents. Part II then proposes 
a balancing test, based on notice and need for data, as a means 
of ascertaining proper routine uses. 
I. THE PRIVACY AcT OF 1974 
A. The Statutory Framework: Prohibition 
and Exemption 
The Privacy Act is the first statutory attempt to regulate the 
distribution of personal records held by federal agencies. In-
tended "to provide certain safeguards for an individual against 
an invasion of personal privacy,"10 the statute requires federal 
agencies to inform individuals supplying information of the au-
thority for the data collection. In addition, agencies must specify 
the principle purposes for which the data will be used, the rou-
tine uses of the collected records, and the effects of refusing to 
provide requested information. 11 
The Act has an even greater effect, however, on information 
disclosure. The legislation explicitly prohibits agencies from dis-
closing records to any person or agency without the written con-
sent of the individual who is the subject of the records. Ill This 
blanket proscription curtails the spread of government-held per-
(6) to the National Archives . . . 
(7) to another agency . . . for a civil or criminal law enforcement activity 
(8) to a person pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affecting 
the health or safety of an individual . . . 
(9) to either House of Congress . . . 
(10) to the Comptroller General ... 
(11) pursuant to the order of a court .... 
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(l)-(ll) (1976) (emphasis added). 
• Id. §§ 552a(b)(3), (a)(7) (1976). 
1
• Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1896. 
11 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3) (1976). 
11 Id. § 552a(b) (1976). 
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sonal information, but also precludes exchanges of data among 
federal agencies for legitimate purposes. To allow for informa-
tion-sharing essential to the everyday functioning of govern-
ment, 13 Congress enacted eleven exemptions to the broad dis-
closure prohibition.14 
One of these exemptions is the routine use exemption, 111 which 
allows disclosure of personal data for uses "compatible with the 
purpose for which the record was collected."18 As a means of 
limiting the agency discretion permitted by the exemption, the 
Act also requires every agency to inform those supplying infor-
mation of the routine uses of the gathered data, 17 and to publish 
annually a list of all its routine uses in the Federal Register.18 
This publication provides constructive notice of routine uses cre-
ated after the pertinent data was collected, and allows diligent 
individuals to locate many of the federal records which concern 
them. 19 As with other provisions of the Act, violations of the 
routine use exemption may result in civil and criminal liability.20 
Recently, Congress has exhibited some concern as to whether 
the printing of routine uses sufficiently informs the public. 21 
However, there has been no such concern as to whether routine 
use designations are justified. The significance of this latter is-
sue is evident: if federal agencies are allowed to define a routine 
use without oversight or review, then any disclosure of informa-
tion may fall within the routine use exemption. The primary 
purpose of the Privacy Act would thus be defeated. The solution 
of this abuse, already more real than potential, is the concern of 
,. See notes 58-65 and accompanying text infra. 
,. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976). See note 8 supra. 
'" Id. § 552a(b)(3). 
•• Id. § 552a(a)(7). 
17 Id. § 552a(e)(3). 
•• Id. § 552a(e)(4)(D). Agencies must also publish the categories of individuals on 
whom records are kept and the kinds of records on file. Id. §§ 552a(e)(4) (B), (C). 
10 By searching the Federal Register for routine uses and then writing to those 
agencies which may have pertinent information, an individual could locate many of the 
records which concern him. This procedure is applauded in Project: Government Infor-
mation and the Rights of Citizens, 73 M1cH. L. REV. 971, 1316 (1975) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Government Information Project]. 
•• In case of breach of the routine use exemption, an "adversely affected" individual 
may sue the appropriate agency in federal district court. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(g)(l)(D) (1976). Liability for such a breach requires proof that the agency acted 
willfully or intentionally, and recovery is limited to actual damages, costs, and reasonable 
attorneys' fees. Id. § 552a(g)(4). In addition, any officer or employee of an agency who 
knowingly and willfully violates the exemption is guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be 
fined up to $5,000. Id. § 552a(i)(l). 
11 See Records Maintained by Government Agencies: Hearings on H.R. 9527 and Re-
lated Bills Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1977). 
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this article. 
B. The Legislative History of Routine Use 
The fitful legislative history of the phrase "routine use" sheds 
little light on its statutory definition. In the House, the Privacy 
Act, as originally introduced111 tautologically defined routine use 
as "a routine purpose for which the records are used or intended 
to be used. "18 The principle of routine use was later enlarged in 
committee by adding a complete ban on disclosure to officials 
who did "not have a need for the records in the performance of 
their duties .... "" The Senate bill15 is even less enlightening. 
Here, the Senate never even considered the term "routine use." 
Rather, it created an exemption which allowed the release of 
records to those who needed the information "in [the] ordinary 
course of ... their duties."se The Senate, however, neither de-
fined nor explained the critical term "ordinary course." 
Evidently then, the-phrase "routine use" emerged as part of a 
compromise struc.k between the staffs of the House and Senate 
Government Operations Committees.17 A staff report explains 
.. H.R. 16373, 93d Cong., 2d Sesa. (1974). 
•• Id. § 3(e)(4). The bill prohibited the release of agency records, without consent, 
unless "disclosure would be ... for a routine use described in any rule promulgated 
pursuant to subsection (e)(4)" (defining routine use). Id. at § 3(b)(4). 
14 H.R. 16373, 93d Cong., 2d Sesa. (1974). 
"" S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sesa., 120 CoNG. REc. 37067 (1974). 
" Id. As introduced, the bill required agencies to disclose "only personal information 
necesaary to accomplish a proper purpose of the organization." Id. § 201(a)(l). "Proper 
purpose" was not defined. In a similar vein, Senate hearings on the bill barely considered 
the routine use concept. For example, Profesaor Alan Westin, a leading authority on 
privacy problems, dismisaed concern over agency abuse of common uses of information 
by stating, "I think it can be provided that regular use of the personal records for routine 
administrative tasks ... are not ones that require specific individual consent." Personal 
Data Hearings, supra note 1, at 82. Profesaor Westin, however, did not suggest criteria 
for identifying "routine administrative tasks." Nor did the reported versions of the pre-
cursor bills or their Committee Reports propose any such criteria. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-
1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sesa. (1974); S. Rep. No. 93-1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sesa., reprinted in 
[1973) U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 6916. 
•• Senator Ervin commented on the unusual compromise: 
On November 21, just before the Thanksgiving recess, both the Senate and 
House passed in different forms Federal privacy legislation. Because of the lim-
ited amount of time available between the time of the reconvening of Congresa 
after the recesa and the end of the sesaion of Congresa members of the Govern-
ment Operations Committee of the Senate and the House agreed that they 
would have the different versions studied by their respective staff's during the 
recess. 
After the recesa the members of the staff's who made this study reported to the 
members of the two committees, and after that the members of the two commit-
tees met informally and agreed on the amendments .... We thought this was a 
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the compromise as a middle ground between the Senate bill's 
"tight restrictions" and the House bill's allowance of agency dis-
closure "without applying the standards of accuracy, relevancy, 
timeliness, or completeness."28 More accurately, the phrase may 
be described as a compromise between those who opposed any 
disclosure of information without the consent of the subject, and 
those who favored agency disclosure so long as the subject is no-
tified. 29 Presumably, the statute•~ ambiguous definition of "rou-
tine use"30 was chosen to please all parties, and thereby guaran-
tee passage of the bill. As a consequence, however, the statutory 
definition offers no standard for determining the validity of rou-
tine use regulations. 
C. Some Problems with the Routine Use Exemption 
1. Overlap with the Freedom of Information Act - Another 
provision of the Privacy Act exempts material disclosable under 
the Freedom of Information Act31 (FOIA) from the Act's general 
prohibition of disclosure. In effect, this subordination of the Pri-
vacy Act means that some records sought by agencies under the 
routine use provision may also be available under the FOIA 
exemption. 
While the Privacy Act prevents disclosure of federal records, 
the FOIA encourages public knowledge of many government 
activities. 32 The statute provides, in part, that all "reasonably 
better way of doing it without having a conference . . . . 
120 CONG. REC. 40,400 (1974). 
•• Id. at 40,405. The staff report, as introduced by Senator Ervin, also states that the 
"compromise definition should serve as a caution to agencies to think out in advance 
what uses it will make of information." Id. at 40,406. 
19 Government Information Project, supra note 18, at 1324. 
ao "The term 'routine use' means ... the use of such record for a purpose which is 
compatible with the purpose for which it was collected." Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(a)(7) (1976) . 
•• 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1979). 
11 The FOIA is based on the belief that "[i)f government is to be truly of, by, and for 
the people, the people must know in detail the activities of government." United States 
Department of Justice, Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information 
Section of the Administrative Procedure Act III (1967). See also S. REP. No. 89-813, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966). 
Originally, commentators subjected the FOIA to considerable criticism, including ch~rges 
of vagueness and poor draftmanship. See Government Information Project, supra note 
18, at 1023-25. A 1972 House Committee on Government Operations report objected to 
frequent withholding of supposedly unidentifiable records, agency delay in responding to 
requests for information, and poor agency communication with Congress. H.R. REP. No. 
92-1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972). However, several 1975 Amendments to the Act 
have largely rectified these problems, and the FOIA today is praised as "a tribute to the 
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described"33 executive branch materials are to be made available 
to the public. Nine exemptions,34 however, prohibit certain dis-
closures, including those which may constitute a "clearly unwar-
ranted invasion"H of personal privacy. Though this last pro-
vision resembles the Privacy Act in its concern for individual 
interests, it nonetheless differs by its failure to expressly con-
sider consent or notice. Although these notions may enter into a 
determination of "clearly unwarranted," the courts have gener-
ally ignored them, and instead have focused on the possible pub-
lic benefit of disclosure. 38 
Aside from this vague safeguard, the FOIA's and the Privacy 
Act's exemptions do not necessarily complement one another: 
overlap may be possible.3' Moreover, the characters of the Act's 
self-confidence of American society." w. SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW: KISSINGER, NIXON, AND 
THE DESTRUCTION OF CAMBODIA 12 (1979). See also H.R. REP. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1974). 
•• FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976). 
14 The FOIA does not apply to matters that are: 
(l)(A) specifically authorized ... to be kept secret ... and (B) are in fact 
properly classified . · . . 
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; 
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ... 
(4) trade secrets ... 
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency [documents] ... which would not be avail-
able by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with an agency; 
(6) personnel and medical files ... the disclosure of which would constitute 
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes ... 
(8) . . . for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation . . . of 
financial institutions; or 
(9) geological and geophysical information . . . . 
Id. § 552(b)(l)-(S). 
•• Id. § 552(b)(6). The meaning of "clearly unwarranted invasion" of privacy remains 
uncertain. Most courts hold that the term requires application of a balancing test, weigh-
ing considerations of public interest in disclosure against possible invasion of individual 
privacy. See, e.g., Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974); Getman v. 
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ferguson v. Kelly, 455 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ill. 
1978). At least one court has held that the statute's language requires only an inquiry 
into the seriousness of the privacy invasion. See, e.g., Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th 
Cir. 1973). 
•• "In performing the balancing, the courts have considered such factors as whether 
there may be an invasion of privacy, the nature of the privacy invaded, the extent of the 
invasion, the public interest that would be served by disclosure, [and) whether the inter-
est could be satisfied without the requested material .... " Government Information 
Project, supra note 18, at 1080 n.714. 
11 Congress reduced the potential for overlap of the Acts' exemptions by amending the 
FOIA in 1976. For example, § 552(b)(3) of the original FOIA stated that the Act did not· 
apply to material "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute .... " FOIA, Pub. 
L. No. 90-23, § 552(b)(3) (1967). The exception now applies, however, to statutes other 
than the Privacy Act, thus insuring that the Privacy Act will not affect, at the very least, 
this FOIA exemption. FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). . 
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exemptions differ: while the FOIA's exemptions are flexible and 
usually demand a weighing of competing considerations, 38 those 
of the Privacy Act are generally rigid, with no balancing of inter-
ests required. Congress, aware of the variance between the laws' 
exemptions and eager to maintain judicial interpretation of the 
FOIA's disclosure. provisions,39 thus created a Privacy Act ex-
emption for any material required to be released by the FOIA.•0 
As a practical matter, the FOIA exemption means that even a 
successful challenge to a routine use designation may not pre-
vent disclosure of records to the public. Thus, routine use litiga-
tion spurred by privacy considerations may prove futile, unless 
knowledge of the Privacy Act is coupled with a thorough under-
standing of the FOIA. 
2. Executive and congressional abuse - The routine use ex-
emption, designed to insure the proper inter-agency transfer of 
information, is the Privacy Act's largest loophole.41 Already the 
provision has led to dangerous abuse of the statute. Indeed, 
within a year of the Act's signing, federal agencies began circum-
venting the legislation by declaring routine uses which ran con-
trary to the spirit of the Privacy Act. 
In the most publicized abuse of the. Privacy Act, Attorney 
General Levi in 1975 requested all federal agencies to designate 
as a routine use the transfer to law enforcement agencies of any 
record indicating a possible violation of the law. •2 The Depart-
ment of Justice also asked agencies to create as a routine use the 
transfer of information to bureaus conducting employment and 
security clearance investigations.43 Subsequently, Justice officials 
admitted that such uses do not accord with the Privacy Act'~ 
definition of a routine use.44 Rather, the suggested uses consti-
18 See, e.g., Government Information Project, supra note 19, at 1080-85, which dis-
cusses the need for a balancing test to give meaning to "clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy." The article also characterizes the Acts' exemptions as "flexible" 
(FOIA), and "blanket approach" (Privacy Act). Id. at 1336-37 . 
•• 120 CONG. REC. 12,244 (1974). 
•• FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1976). "No agency shall disclose any. record ... unless 
disclosure of the record would be-(2) required under section 522 of this title . 
., See Comment, Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview and Critique, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 
667 (1976). 
'" Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Heads of. All Executive Depart-
ments and Agencies, Office of the Attorney General, Washington, D.C., on the Imple-
mentation of the Privacy Act of 1974 Routine Uses of Information (June 5, 1975). 
•• Id. 
•• Interview with Mary Lawton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, Department of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 3, 1976), cited in Belair, 
Agency Implementation of the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act: Im-
pact on the Government's Collection, Maintenance and Dissemination of Personally 
Identifiable Information, 10 J. MAR. J. OF PRAc. & PROC. 465, 501 (1977). 
134 Journal of Law Reform. [VOL. 14 
tute an attempt to avoid the stringent procedural requirements 
of another Privacy Act exemption° which does allow disclosure 
for law enforcement activities. To date, the Attorney General's 
recommendations have been widely adopted-so widely that a 
1977 Report of the Commission on Federal Paperwork noted 
that, "[i]n many instances, agency 'routine use' notices authorize 
transfers for purposes which, by no stretch of the imagination"48 
could be considered legitimate routine uses. 
Congress has also manipulated the routine use exemption. 
Immediately after the Act's signing, many agencies refused to 
transfer personal information to congressional caseworkers who 
were trying to aid constituents. Under significant pressure from 
Congress, the Office of Management and Budget soon advised 
agencies to consider disclosure to congressional staff a routine 
use.47 The agencies, however, received no reciprocal assurance 
that congressional workers would use the information in a man-
ner compatible with the purpose for which it was first col-
lected. 48 Congress, in other words, has exempted its employees 
from the Privacy Act. 49 
II. A BALANCING TEsT To DEFINE APPROPRIATE 
ROUTINE USES 
To date, the response to this distortion of congressional intent 
has been limited. A few commentators have called for legislative 
reform of the Privacy Act,110 suggesting that routine use dis~ 
closures fall more clearly within previously designated routine 
•• Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7) (1976), allows the release of information 
without consent if the disclosure is: 
to another agency ... for a civil or criminal law enforcement activity if the 
activity is authorized by law, and if the head of the agency or instrumentality 
has made a written request to the agency which maintains the record specifying 
the particular portion desired and the law enforcement activity for which the 
record is sought ... (emphasis added) . 
•• FEDERAL PAPERWORK COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 65-66. 
" 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741-42 (1975). The agency-and not the Congress-promulgates the 
routine use. 
•• See Belair, supra note 44, at 502. 
•• That is, Congress itself has a statutory exemption under the Privacy Act of 1974, 
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(9) (1976). 
•• See, e.g., Singleton & Hunter, Statutory and Judicial Response to the Problem of 
Access to Government Information, 1979 DET. C. L. REV. 51 (1979); Vache & Makibe, 
Privacy in Government Records: Philosophical Perspectives and Proposals for Legisla-
tion, 14 GoNz. L. REV. 515 (1979). Note, Protecting Privacy from Government Invasion: 
Legislation at the Federal and State Levels, 8 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 783 (1978). 
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uses.111 However, even such innocuous reform is extremely un-
likely, given Congress' own selective abuse of the statute. As a 
consequence, responsibility for the true execution of the Act 
rests with the courts. Here too though, the reaction has been 
muted. The cases have been few, and the courts, without clear 
definitional standards, seem unwilling to determine the validity 
of routine use designations. u 
A. Components of the Test 
Fortunately, the criteria necessary to ascertain the legitimacy 
of a routine use may be found in the underlying purposes of the 
Privacy Act. Indeed, by balancing the statute's general goal (pre-
serving privacy) against the specific designs of the routine use 
exemption (maintaining government functions), a test for appro-
priate routine uses may be designed which accurately reflects 
•• See, e.g., Note, Protecting Privacy from Government Invasion, supra note 50 
(which proposes a state privacy act based on the Privacy Act of 1974). 
u Only four cases have considered routine use regulations. In Local 2047, Am. Fed'n 
of Gov't Employees v. Defense Gen. Supply Center, 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978), the 
absence of an applicable routine use regulation presented the primary issue. In Defense 
General, the plaintiff union sought enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement 
which required the defendant to release certain information concerning its employees. 
The court, affirming the district court decision, found that the release of records required 
by the labor contract did not fall within a routine use regulation, and was thus prohib-
ited by the Privacy Act. In reaching its decision, the court readily accepted the Civil 
Service Commission's interpretation of its own regulations. Similarly, in Stiles v. Atlanta 
Gas Light Co., 453 F. Supp. 798 (N.D. Ga. 1978), the court quashed a subpoena issued to 
the Department of Labor on the grounds that the information requested was not covered 
by one of the Department's routine uses. The court did not test the legitimacy of the 
pertinent routine use designations, merely stating "[t)o construe the routine use provi-
sions as defendant requests would undermine the purpose of the Privacy Act." Id. at 
799-800. 
However, the court upheld a disclosure of information in Burley v. United States Drug 
Enforcement Administration, 443 F. Supp. 619 (M.D. Tenn. 1977). In Burley, the court, 
without significant analysis, held that a Department of Justice routine use regulation 
allowed the transfer of an investigative report from the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion to the Kentucky Board of Pharmacy. The information was sought for a hearing 
which considered the revocation of plaintiff's pharmacist license. Finally, in Harper v. 
United States, 423 F. Supp. 192 (D.S.C. 1976), the court denied an injunction and dam-
ages for the transfer of data between branches of the Internal Revenue Service. Again 
the opinion merely noted the applicable routine use regulation, and avoided any evalua-
tion of its legitimacy. · 
The rationales of these cases are marked by a paucity of analysis. One lower court 
emphasized the deference traditionally given to agency regulations. See, e.g., Local 2047, 
Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Defense Gen. Supply Center, 423 F. Supp. 481, 485 
(E.D. Va. 1976), atf'd, 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978). Whether a balancing test designed to 
evaluate the validity of routine use regulations would remove this and other obstacles to 
judicial assessment remains unknown. But at the very least, it would ease the courts' 
task, and place the decisions on analytic grounds. 
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congressional intent. 
In developing this test, courts should place on one side of the 
balance those factors which favor the frequently repeated goal of 
insuring individual privacy in the face of a growing govern-
ment.118 According to Congress, the Privacy Act achieves this 
objective by both prohibiting information disclosure, and by 
providing public notice of the routine uses of government held 
personal records. 114 
This notice, however, should not be equated with the con-
structive notice provided by publication of routine uses in the 
Federal Register. Such constructive notice assumes, without ad-
equate reason, actual knowledge of a routine use,'111 and thus fails 
to further privacy interests. Rather, notice should correspond di-
rectly to the foreseeability of a routine use.116 By so defining no-
tice, one insures that an individual will not be charged with 
knowledge of a completely unanticipated routine use. 
In turn, foreseeability would depend upon the nature and 
specificity of the information requested, and its relation to the 
apparent reasons for its gathering. Generally, the narrower the 
information supplied, or the more closely the data relates to the . 
reasons for its collection, the less the foreseeability of potential 
routine uses. Thus, for example, if an individual were to supply 
detailed, specific information, closely related to the purposes for 
its collection, then his notice would be low, save for those rou-
tine uses clearly foreseeable.117 On the other hand, if the individ-
ual were to supply broad, nonspecific information, not closely re-
lated to the apparent reasons for its collection, then his notice 
would be high, unless the pertinent routine uses were clearly un-
related to the object of the data acquisition. 
The counterweight to the general goal of_ protecting privacy is 
the desire to guarantee the proper and efficient distribution of 
state services. This may be stated more specifically as the inten-
tion to meet legitimate agency information requirements.116 Here, 
•• See note 10 and accompanying text supra; notes 61-63 and accompanying text 
infra. 
•• S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 25, at 1. 
•• Constructive notice is the equivalent of notice assumed as a matter of law. 
•• Thus, the greater the foreseeability of a routine use, the higher the "presumptive" 
notice of the use. 
07 Actual notice or knowledge of a routine use would, of course, carry the highest 
possible degree of presumptive notice. 
•• See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, supra note 25, at 3: 
H.R. 16373 provides a series of basic safeguards for the individual to help rem-
edy the misuse of personal information by the Federal Government and reassert 
the fundamental rights of personal privacy of all Americans that are derived 
from the Constitution of the United States. At the same time, it recognizes the 
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departmental need of requested records should rest on the 
actual relevance of the information to the agency's assigned 
function, and not on the information's possible utility. 
In determining the relevance of requested data, the courts 
must examine the agency's proper role, rather than its potential 
duties. Clearly, data collection for reasons of political advantage 
or personal vendetta fall beyond the pale of any agency. Hence, 
the need for such data must be viewed as nonexistent. Similarly, 
the gathering of information in unjustified anticipation of new 
duties fails to establish great need for the records. On the other 
hand, long-established transfers of information, essential to the 
requesting agency's function, may be considered highly relevant 
to bureaucratic duties. Thus, for example, the Commerce De-
partment may be said to have a high need for Agriculture De-
partment statistics, particularly when predicting future exports. 
Between these two extremes, however, abstract principles are of 
little value. A case-by-case approach would serve the courts far 
better. 
Once a court determines the relative weights of these counter-
vailing forces, it becomes fairly easy to strike the balance be-
tween them. If both the agency's need for data and the subject's 
notice of the designated routine uses are high, then the court 
should allow the routine use exemption. 69 In such a case, the 
agency's use of the information may be considered compatible 
with the purpose for which the records were collected. On the 
other hand, if both of these determining factors are low, then 
the court should view the intended uses as "incompatible," and 
preclude application of the routine use exemption. 60 
Difficulties in application of the test could arise, of course, in 
situations where one of the competing interests fails to clearly 
outweigh the other-for example, when an individual's presump-
tive notice of the use is low, while the agency's need for the data 
sharing is high. Given the great deference the courts customarily 
legitimate need of the Federal Government to collect, store, use, and share 
among various agencies certain types of personal data. 
00 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) (1976). For example, a legitimate routine 
use would allow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), attempting to establish 
maximum levels of safe exposure to radiation, to receive information from the Veteran's 
Administration (VA) regarding the disability claims of servicemen who attended nuclear 
tests. Here, both the Commission's need for the data and the degree of foreseeability 
would be great. Indeed, many servicemen may welcome such use of their records, for the 
data may not only aid their claims, but also insure safer radiation standards. 
00 Thus, a request by the NRC to the VA for information concerning disability claims 
of servicemen exposed to Agent Orange could not be a legitimate routine use. Neither 
the agency's need for the records (which bears no relation to the NRC's purpose), nor 
the soldiers' presumptive notice would be sufficiently high to justify the transfer. 
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accord agency regulations, the burden of ··proof in these cases 
should rest on the plaintiff.61 
B. Support in the Legislative History 
A review of the Privacy Act's legislativ.e history supports a 
balancing test weighing individual notice ~gainst agency need. 
As already mentioned, the express purpose of the Privacy Act is 
"to promote governmental respect for the privacy of citizens."62 
More specifically, the Act is a reaction to the growing potential 
for invasion of privacy occasioned by the expansion of federal 
agencies and the sophistication of modern computers.63 Accord-
ingly, the substantive provisions of the law attempt to insure 
that an agency may have access only to the private information 
it truly needs.64 At the same time, the Act was specifically 
designed not to hamper orderly and necessary government 
functions. 66 
In light of these purposes, the most expansive notion of "rou-
tine use" comes from Congressman Carlos Moorhead, the Chair-
man of the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and 
Government Information. Moorhead, who introduced the rou-
tine use exemption bill, described the exemption as not merely 
•• Courts have already taken this position: 
Agency regulations promulgated pursuant to specific congressional authority 
are presumptively valid and are entitled to great deference . . . . It is not 
enough to show that other policy considerations could justify the adoption of a 
different regulation. The burden is placed upon the person attacking the regula-
tion to establish that it is inconsistent with the statute it implements. 
Local 2047, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Defense Gen. Supply Center, 423 F. Supp. 
481, 485 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd, 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978). Though the placement of 
the burden of proof on the plaintiff may be dictated by well-established administrative 
law, it does not necessarily· follow from the Privacy Act, whose primary purpose is to 
protect the individual from government intrusion. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 
25, at 1. 
•• S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 25, at 46. 
•• See the legislative findings, reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 40,400 (1974) . 
.. See 120 CONG. REc. 40,398 (1974) which discusses the stated purpose of S. 3418. 
•• See, e.g., Congressman Horton's remarks supporting the Act: 
Mr. Speaker, in writing H.R. 16373, the House [precursor) bill which is very 
similar to the measure now before us, the Government Operations Committee, 
on which I serve as ranking minority member, made great efforts toward this 
end: as we added privacy protections ·for citizens, we did not want to add great 
burdens for Government agencies in implementing the bill. I think that we ac-
complished that goal by drawing the legislation so that agencies would have to 
publicize what they were doing, but would not have to submit to unreasonable 
requirements which would in effect prevent them from carrying out constructive 
programs. 
120 CONG. REC. 40,885 (1974). 
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ref erring to the common and ordinary use of records, but also 
"includ[ing] all of the proper and necessary uses, even if any 
such use occurs infrequently."88 Moorhead's remarks evince a 
far-reaching interpretation of "routine use," and his comments 
were echoed by the House Report of the bill, which indicated 
that it was the Committee's intention not to interfere with the 
orderly conduct of government.87 When one considers that the 
bill reported out of the House Committee was ultimately 
amended to restrict its broad conception of routine use,88 it be-
comes clear that the Congressman's and the Committee's state-
ments define the widest possible interpretation of the exemp-
tion. In other words, routine use may not exceed an agency's 
delegated and proper function. 
In contrast to_ this "proper function" limit for a routine use, 
the Senate chose a "statutory limit," which required statutory 
authorization and agreement between the agencies before 
records could be released.89 Inasmuch as the Senate later 
amended the bill to broaden disclosure of information,70 one 
may conclude that even unde·r the harshest test, a routine use 
created by statute and written agreement is legitimate. 
Though the original House and Senate positions establish the 
limits of routine use·, they remain flawed and inconsistent. The 
House proper function test insures the efficiency of government, 
but fails to protect privacy; conversely, the Senate statutory 
standard guards the individual, but hampers provision of state 
services. Neither standard furthers both the broad goals of the 
Privacy Act and the specific purposes of the exemption. In con-
trast, the balancing test proposed here not only incorporates the 
broad goals of the Privacy Act and the routine use exemption, 
but also insures routine use determinations consistent with the 
Act's definition and the House and Senate proposals. Indeed, by 
examining those factors which affect agency need-such as the 
House bill's concept of proper administrative function, or the 
" 120 CONG. REC. 36,967 (1974). 
•
1 H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, supra note 25, at 12. 
" See 120 CONG. REC. 40,405-06 (1974) and notes 26, 27 and accompanying text supra. 
In setting forth the limits of routine use, it is best to remember "the tendency will exist 
for agencies to construe any exemption more broadly than it is intended to apply or than 
is necessary to achieve the purpose of exemption." FEDERAL PAPERWORK COMMISSION, 
supra note 2, at 43 (statement of Elliot Richardson). 
•• More. specifically, the Senate Report stated that the type of "regular" use envi-
sioned is that "where, by statute and written agreement for information-sharing among 
agencies, there is access .... " S. Rep. No. 93-1183, supra note 25, at 51. The report 
does not indicate the meaning of "written agreement." 
1
• See 120 CONG. REC. 40,405-06 (1974). 
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Senate bill's concept of publicized authorization-the test pro-
posed here incorporates both Congressional proposals, thereby 
guaranteeing routine use designations compatible with the 
House and Senate perspectives.71 
CONCLUSION 
The Privacy Act's routine use exemption remains susceptible 
to further abuse. In an effort to ameliorate these abuses, this 
article proposes a balancing test for determining the validity of 
routine use regulations. Under this analysis, a court weighs the 
presumptive notice of a routine use against the agency's legiti-
mate need to share information. The balancing test thereby at-
tempts to further the purposes of the Privacy Act, yet maintain 
responsiveness to different fact situations. Although statutory 
classification of the term "routine use" would be desirable, such 
amendment is unlikely.71 The courts, therefore, must bear the 
burden of restricting the agencies' unqualified use of the exemp-
tion. Until then, the public's privacy rests upon the self-restraint 
of the federal bureaucracy. 
-John W. Finger 
71 It is probable that many members of Congress recognized the balancing of interests 
inherent in the drafting of the Privacy Act. For example, Senator Muskie said, "I am 
pleased to note that this Act·has developed an important balance between the rights of 
privacy of each of our citizens and the public need for disclosure .... " 120 CONG. REC. 
40,410 (1974). 
71 See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra. 
